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Abstract: 
The development and adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices will grow significantly in the coming years to enable 
Industry 4.0. Many forms of IoT devices will be developed and 
used across industry verticals. However, the euphoria of this 
technology adoption is shadowed by the solemn presence of cyber 
threats that will follow its growth trajectory. Cyber threats would 
either embed their malicious code or attack vulnerabilities in IoT 
that could induce significant consequences in cyber and physical 
realms. In order to manage such destructive effects, incident 
responders and cyber investigators require the capabilities to find 
these rogue IoT and contain them quickly. Such online devices 
may only leave network activity traces. A collection of relevant 
traces could be used to infer the IoT’s network behavioral 
fingerprints and in turn could facilitate investigative find of these 
IoT. However, the challenge is how to infer these fingerprints 
when there is limited network activity traces. This research 
proposes the novel model construct that learns to infer the 
network behavioral fingerprint of specific IoT based on limited 
network activity traces using a One-Class Time Series Meta-
learner called DeepNetPrint. Our research also demonstrates the 
application of DeepNetPrint to identify IoT devices that performs 
comparatively well against leading supervised learning models. 
Our solution would enable cyber investigator to identify specific 
IoT of interest while overcoming the constraints of having only 
limited network activity traces of the IoT.  
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1. Introduction 
The adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) will grow 
significantly as we enter in Industry 4.0. IoT exist in varied 
forms from stationary surveillance sensors to flying drones. 
According to World Economic Forum [1], IoT is multifaceted 
with a largely uncoordinated group of stakeholders that poses 
exciting opportunities as well as inchoate and chaotic 
environment. IoT are computer embedded physical devices 
that operates in cyber or digital space. One key feature of its 
cyber characteristics is their ability to communication with 
each other in wired or wireless communication channels to 
communicate exchange information and send / receive 
instructions. The evolution of IoT will grow along with the 
pervasive growth of edge computing and wireless 
communication technologies.  
As with all technologies especially those cyber enabled 
or connected to the Internet, there will be Cybercriminal or 
Cyber Security attackers seeking opportunity to exploit the 
IoT’s mass adoption to disrupt the security and safety of the 
cyber landscape. The origins of attack may start from the initial 
development of IoT devices with the embedding of malicious 
code to active adversarial attacks against vulnerable IoT like 
the Mirai attacks against routers and networking devices [2]. 
In the case of Mirai incident, there was massive disruption to 
transportation and health care services. Such rogue or infected 
IoT may exist not only in swarms or large numbers. There may 
be one or a few rogue IoT controlled by individual like a rogue 
drone. Hence against such highly probable security risks, 
incident responders and cyber investigators will need to have 
the means to identify these rogue IoT and contain them in a 
timely manner. However, to identify these rogue IoT, forms of 
datapoints that uniquely identifies these rogues or their 
fingerprints will need to be inferred from limitedly available 
traces of the rogue’s activities. For IoT, that will likely be the 
network activity traces originating from those devices. Even if 
such network behavioral fingerprints may be inferred, finding 
these IoT is a resource intense task when these IoT exist with 
other non-rogue IoT and communicating devices on that same 
communication channel. While the daunting task of 
identifying the IoT may be addressed through modern 
techniques with the use of Machine Learning or Artificial 
Intelligence algorithms, however most of such algorithms 
requires significant amount of training data with good 
behavioral inductive biases to train an effective detection or 
identification model.  
This research proposes two novelties. The first is the 
novel model construct that learns to infer the network 
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behavioral fingerprint of IoT based on limited samples of 
network activity traces using a One-Class Time Series Meta-
learner called DeepNetPrint. The second is the novel 
application of this DeepNetPrint to identify IoT devices of 
interest that performs comparatively well against leading 
supervised learning models. Our model enables the 
identification of specific IoT of interest for cyber investigation 
while overcoming the constraints of only having limited 
network activity traces of the IoT. 
The next section of this paper provides background 
information about challenges faced in performing IoT 
investigation with behavioral fingerprints. This is followed by 
related research work in identifying IoT based on network 
behavioral fingerprints and in metric based meta-learner 
algorithms. The description of the proposed model construct is 
covered next, followed by the description of experiments and 
an analysis of the results. The paper concludes with a 
conclusion and discussion about future research directions.     
2. Background Information 
2.1. Challenges in IoT Investigation 
IoT are digitally enabled forms of physical objects that 
could become malicious smart devices whose threat actors 
originate from both cyber and physical dimensions. Attacks 
originating from rogue IoT could have cyber and physical 
consequences. According to Zulkipli et al. [3], four broad 
categories of threat source to IoT. They are the Mischievous or 
Misbehave users of IoT who perform the assaults. Second is 
the immoral manufacturer that embeds malicious code into the 
devices. Third is the external adversary that exploits 
vulnerabilities resident in the IoT and subsequently initiate 
attacks on others and finally poor software development that 
create vulnerabilities in IoT.  
When rogue IoT draws the attention of the cyber security 
incident responders or cybercrime investigators, the 
investigators’ primarily task is to first find IoT devices of 
interest so that containment or investigation may be applied. 
This ‘Identification’ step is the first step in the Investigation 
Phase as defined in the Digital Forensics Investigation Process 
[4]. With such rogue, finding the physical location of these 
devices may not be easily done however there will likely be 
only their traces in the form of network activities available for 
the investigator. However, these network activity traces exist 
in the larger ocean of network activities from many other 
digitally enabled devices. Hence the problem becomes a search 
for the ‘needle in the haystack’. 
2.2. Cyber Investigation using Behavioral Fingerprints  
Fingerprint in digital space is liken to human fingerprints 
that represents a cluster of datapoints that uniquely identifies 
an individual or object. For IoT devices or other forms of ICT 
equipment, such fingerprints refer to the collection of features 
to identify the device and its associated state [5]. The 
characteristics of devices’ fingerprints should universally be 
applicable to all devices, enable unique identification of each 
and every device, invariant over time and facilitate collection 
from the devices’ signals [15]. In the context of this research, 
the objective is to identify IoT devices of interest that carries a 
certain network behavioral fingerprint. Such fingerprint 
originates from a collection of sequence network activity 
traces with sufficient inductive biases to enable a model to 
infer its associate uniquely with the device. Such fingerprints 
may have unique static or sequence features that are generated 
from software and / or user interactions running on the 
computing devices.  
Network behavioral fingerprints may be acquired by 
active or passive means that involves the use of network tools 
like network sniffers. However, within such network extracts 
or traces, they would have lots of noise in the form of network 
activity traces belonging to other computing nodes or devices 
that uses that network to communicate with each other. Hence 
the task of identifying whether a specific network behavioral 
fingerprint exists in crowded network is a complex and high 
laborious task if it is undertaken by manual searches.  
There are solutions available in the form of signature 
based or machine learning / artificial intelligence algorithms to 
offload the complex and laborious task of identifying a 
network behavioral fingerprint. With signature based, their 
rigid signature definitions limit their ability to detect sequence 
based behavioral fingerprints. With machine learning or 
contemporary artificial intelligence algorithms, such solutions 
are typically constrained by the need for large number of 
sample fingerprints to train a model. 
3. Related Work 
3.1. Machine / Deep Learning in Behavioral Pattern 
Detection 
Miettinen et al. [11] developed a solution called IoT 
Sentinel that is capable of identifying IP-based IoT devices 
based on passively observed network behavioral fingerprints 
originating from those devices. The classification was done 
using Random Forest. Aksoy and Gunes [12] further improved 
the identification technique with their SysID that used a variety 
of machine learning algorithms (Decision Table, J48 Decision 
Trees, OneR , and PART) with Genetic Algorithm (GA) for 
  
feature selection to automate the identification of devices from 
network traffic traces. However, both techniques used 
supervised learning approaches which may not generalize well 
with new devices with no prior training applied to these 
models.  
3.2. Meta-Learning 
Meta Learning is a subdomain of machine learning with 
algorithms designed to use metadata to perform automatic 
learning that is flexible to solve learning problems. Unlike the 
popular Supervised learning or Unsupervised learning 
algorithms that are not optimal for this task of learning from 
limited data samples, Meta Learning is focused on learning to 
learn that results in its ability to acquire knowledge versatility 
to learn new skills or adapt to new environment with minimal 
training examples. More concretely like humans, a trained 
meta learner model would recognize a new object with only 
one or a few samples. The training of Meta Learning 
algorithms or Meta-leaners comprises of two stages. The first 
is to train a classifier 𝑓" for a specific task. In the same time, 
an optimizer 𝑆, 𝜃& = 	𝑔"(𝜃, 𝑆) learns to update the learner’s 
hyperparameters with support set of data from varied classes. 
The final step will be to update 𝜃 and ∅ to maximize the 
following. 
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In this research work, we applied the metric based meta 
learning algorithm to address the defined problem statement of 
identify network behavioral fingerprints of an IoT device of 
interest with only one fingerprint sample. Metric based meta-
learners closely resembles nearest neighbours algorithms like 
knn classification or k-means clustering with kernel density 
estimation. The predicted probability over a set of known 
labels 𝑦@ is a weighted sum of labels of support set samples. 
The weight is generated by a kernel function 𝑘", measuring 
the similarity between two data samples. 
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The Prototypical network [6] is one such metric based 
meta-learner. The algorithm computes a prototype 𝑐 for each 
class 𝑖 which is represented as a mean to the embeddings of 
the feature inputs. The Euclidean distance of the prototypes 𝑐@ 
of the varied classes against the query is used to compute the 
similarity measurement. 
 
 
Figure 1. Extracted Diagram from Snell et. al [6]  
 
Huang et. al [13] proposed their Deep Prototypical 
Networks that leveraged on the embedding space to capture 
discrepancies of difference time series patterns from different 
class to deal with problem of data scarcity.  
 
 
Figure 2. Extracted Diagram from Huang et. al [13] 
 
However, ours goes further to perform similarity matches 
with only One Class that represents the IoT of interest instead 
of multiple classes. 
4. Model 
We developed a unique model construct for DeepNetPrint 
that is composed of two deep learning modules. The first 
modular construct is a ConvLSTM based Autoencoder that 
encodes network activity traces into encodings that represent 
the network activity traces embeddings. These encodings are 
then fed into the second modular construct which is a One 
Class Time Series Prototypical Network that is the meta 
learner based on prototype theory [14] from Cognitive Science 
and Prototypical Networks for few-shot classification [6].  
4.1. Autoencoder  
The first modular construct of DeepNetPrint is an 
Autoencoder that uses the Convolutional Long-Short Term 
Memory (ConvLSTM) [7]. This ConvLSTM based 
Autoencoder learns the embedding of the network behavioral 
patterns from the input feeds extracted from the network 
  
activity traces. The embeddings used in this research is 
character based [8] hence the embeddings are immediately 
derived from raw network activity trace inputs. The 
ConvLSTM uses convolutional structures in both the input-to-
state and state-to-state transitions of the LSTM recurrent 
neural network. With convolutional structures, the ConvLSTM 
ingests the character embeddings as spatial temporal inputs. 
The following are the mathematical expressions for the 
ConvLSTM. 
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  𝐹F = 	𝜎(𝑊;U ∗ 𝑋F +𝑊LU ∗ 𝐻FNO +𝑊PU ∘ 𝐶FNO + 𝑏U) (4) 
 
  𝐶F = 	 𝑓F ∘ 𝐶FNO + 𝑖@ ∘ tanh(𝑊;P + 𝑋F +𝑊LP ∗ 𝐻FNO + 𝑏P) (5) 
 
  𝑂F = 	𝜎(𝑊;[ ∗ 𝑋F +𝑊L[ ∗ 𝐻FNO +𝑊P[ ∘ 𝐶FNO + 𝑏[) (6) 
 
  𝐻F = 	 𝑜F ∘ tanh(𝑉F) (7) 
 
The ‘∗’ operators that performs convolution operation 
while ‘◦’ is the Hadamard product for the element-wise product 
of matrices. The rest of network structure performs, like the 
LSTM network, processes the input, forget, cell, output and 
hidden state computations for each timestep denoted by 𝐼 ,𝐹 ,𝐶 ,𝑂  and 𝐻  respectively with activation by 𝜎  and 
convolutional filter computation with the sets of weights, 𝑊.  
Our ConvLSTM based Autoencoder can be expressed 
mathematically as such.  
 
a = 𝑥	®	𝐹 (8) 
  
b = 𝐹	®	𝑥& (9) 
  
a,b = arg 	min
a,b ‖𝑥 −(b	 ∘ a)𝑥‖e (10) 
 
The training of the Autoencoder is done by minimizing 
the reconstruction error from the output of decoder 𝑥& from 
the input vector 𝑥	. However only the encoder’s output F, that 
represents the feature space, is used as inputs to the next 
modular construct that is the One Class Time Series 
Prototypical Network. 
 
 
Figure 3. Autoencoder for DeepNetPrint 
4.2. One Class Time Series Prototypical Networks 
The second part of the modular construct of our 
DeepNetPrint is a One Class Time Series Prototypical 
Networks that performs this similarity measurement of the 
query point (which is a sample of the network activity traces) 
against the prototype of one class (or Target class) that 
represents the network behavioral fingerprint of the IoT device 
that the investigator is interested in. However, to compute the 
similarity comparison of the query input, there should typically 
be two or more classes with Prototypical Networks. We 
followed a similar approached used by Oza and Patel [9] by 
introducing a Null class represents the origin in the embedding 
space. The origin exists in the form of a ‘silent’ character 
embedding of the network activity traces with null characters.  
Both the Target and Null classes’ encodings are generated 
from ordered sequence of network activity trace samplings (20 
sequenced samples) by the encoder of the ConvLSTM 
Autoencoder. These encodings are then further encoded into 
embedding support points by the Time Series Prototypical 
Network using similar approach by Huang et. al [13]. The 
embedded support point is computed through 𝑓f  with 
learnable parameters f.   
 𝒄g = 1|𝑆g| 5 𝑓f(𝛼(𝑥@))(;B,<B)Î1j  (11) 
  𝑝f(𝑦 = 𝑘|𝑥) = 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥p−𝑑(𝑓f(𝛼(𝑥)), 𝑐g)r 
 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑑(𝑓f(𝛼(𝑥)), 𝑐g))∑ exp	(−𝑑(𝑓f(𝛼(𝑥)), 𝑐gx))gx  
 
(12) 
  𝐽(f) = − log 𝑝f(𝑦 = 𝑘|𝑥) (13) 
 
The computation of the prototype 𝒄𝒌 or centroid of the 
class’ embedded support points is the mean vector where k is 
either Target or Null class. The measurement of the query point 
x, which is encoded by the encoder, from the network activity 
trace sampling is then measured as a probability distribution to 
the classes based on a distance function d using the Euclidean 
distance with either of the k classes.  
The approach used to train of this module construct 
resembles the training of One-Shot Siamese Network [10] by 
providing labelled examples of positive and negative pairs of 
similarity measures in a supervised manner using the 
following loss function expression.  
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The objective is for the network is to maximize the match 
accuracies. The following diagram Figure. 4 illustrates the 
inputs fed into DeepNetPrint for training and inference with 
the same 20 sequenced network samplings from Target class 
that represents the Target’s network behavioral fingerprint and 
query point that is a single network activity trace from a 
continuous network activity stream. The Null class is similarly 
fed into DeepNetPrint as a constant of 20 null samples.  
 
 
Figure 4. Prototypes and Query Point 
 
The inputs to the combined modular constructs of both 
the Autoencoder and the One Class Time Series Prototypical 
Network or Meta-Leaner is illustrated in Figure. 5 with 
network inputs for the Target class, Null class and query point 
represented as 𝑥F, 𝑥, 𝑥}. 
 
 
Figure 5. DeepNetPrint Framework 
5. Methodology and Analysis 
5.1. Dataset and Training 
In our research, we used a related research’s dataset of 
network activity packet captures (PCAP formatted files) of 23 
IoT devices [11]. The devices are Aria, D-LinkCam, D-
LinkDayCam, D-LinkDoorSensor, D-LinkHomeHub, D-
LinkSensor, D-LinkSiren, D-LinkSwitch, D-LinkWaterSensor, 
EdimaxPlug1101W, EdimaxPlug2101W, EdnetGateway, 
HomeMaticPlug, HueBridge, HueSwitch, iKettle2, Lightify, 
MAXGateway, SmarterCoffee, TP-LinkPlugHS100, TP-
LinkPlugHS110, WeMoLink, Withings. The packets from this 
dataset are network messages transmitted during the start-up 
sequence of the devices. From past related research work 
[11][12], it has been demonstrated that these packets have the 
needed inductive biases for our model to infer the devices’ 
network behavioral fingerprints. The dataset was however 
imbalanced with variance from tens of packets to thousands 
from the different classes.  
About half of the entire dataset, that is 12 out of 23 
devices, was used for training. We trained DeepNetPrint in two 
phases. The first phase was to train only the Autoencoder 
model with the training dataset of IoT devices’ network 
activity patterns to learn the network activity trace embeddings. 
The second phase involves having the encoder of the 
Autoencoder generate the encodings of the inputs (Target, Null 
and query) and feeding them into the One Class Meta-Learner 
with similarity pairs. The training approach used for second 
phase followed the training approach used by Koch et. al [10] 
to train a similarity classifier with positive and negative pairs. 
The positive pairs consist of network activity trace samplings 
from the same device with one of the pairs as the network 
behavioral fingerprint (20 sequenced samplings) representing 
the Target class and the other as the query point with one 
sample of the network activity traces. The negative pair used 
different network activity sampling sets from different devices 
for the Target class and query point. The Null class is the same 
for both pairs as origin to the embeddings.  
The testing of the model was done with the entire dataset 
of 23 devices including packet data of network activity traces 
from the 11 of the 23 devices previously not seen by the model. 
The testing of the model was done to evaluate the model’s 
ability to infer the network behavioral fingerprint of both 
previously trained devices and new ones to identify the devices 
from a single sample of network activity packet. The testing 
approach was organized in same manner as other research 
objectives in order to evaluate our model against other models 
namely the IoT Sentinel [11] and SysID [12].  
Pre-processing was applied on the entire dataset to extract 
only the information source field of the PCAP into common 
separated values or CSV formatted files. Unlike the other 
referenced models that used varying number of features (up to 
33) from the packets, we only extracted the ‘Information 
Source’ field containing the high-level information of the 
network packets that would represent ‘conversational 
dialogues’ originating from the IoT devices to train the model 
and infer the devices’ network behavioral fingerprints 
!
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identification later. This field was chosen as it contains 
relevant information about packets transmitted from the 
devices and its applicability to encrypted network activity 
traffic. The following extracts of datasets. 
 
 
Figure 6. Extract of 10 packets from an IoT Devices from 
Dataset 
 
5.2. Results and Analysis 
Testing involved using the entire dataset that contained all 
23 IoT devices’ network activity samplings. The test objective 
was to assess DeepNetPrint’s ability to infer the network 
behavioral fingerprint of a selected IoT device and to flag out 
the probable existence of the network activities originating 
from that Target device from a stream of network activity 
packets.  
The procedures for the testing involved the sequential 
selection of each IoT device from the dataset containing 
network activity traces from 23 devices as Target class or 
device of interest. A short sample of a series of packets (20 
network packets ordered sequence to represent 20 samplings) 
in CSV format from that device was fed to the model. The 
classification test was done by iterating through all CSV 
formatted extracts for each and every IoT device in the dataset 
as part of the query input packet stream 𝑥} against the Target 
class 𝑥F	and Null class 𝑥 . Both 𝑥F  and 𝑥  need only be 
encoded once through the Autoencoder as both remain 
unchanged during the search for the specific fingerprint of 
interest. 𝑥}  query stream was encoded for each and every 
packet. This input construct was organized in this way to 
closely mimic the environment that an investigator faced in 
assessing whether the IoT device of interest was 
communicating on that channel being monitored.  
DeepNetPrint performed well with an identification 
accuracy of 81% for all 23 IoT devices and 80% for the 
previously unseen network activities from the 11 IoT devices.  
 
 
Table 1. Accuracy Performance of DeepNetPrint 
 
We subsequently compared the accuracy performance of 
the DeepNetPrint with those IoT Sentinel and SysID. 
DeepNetFinger fared well relative IoT Sentinel’s 79% and 
SysID’s 82% for all IoT devices including the 11 devices that 
DeepNetPrint has not been trained before. Table 1 shows the 
accuracy comparison in classifying the devices between 
DeepNetFinger and SysID.  
 
 
Table 1. Performance Comparison of DeepNetPrint and 
SysID 
 
In some instances, DeepNetFinger performed 
comparatively better for devices that had similar fingerprints 
as they originate from the same brand or manufacturer from 
the dataset used. 
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Table 2. Classification Performance of Brand Category 
6. Conclusion and Future Directions 
In this research, we developed a model called 
DeepNetPrint that addressed the challenge of inferring the 
IoT’s network behavioral fingerprint with limited network 
activity traces. The DeepNetPrint compromises of ConvLSTM 
based Autoencoder and One Class Time Series Prototypical 
Network. We evaluated our model against other similar models 
that performed comparatively well in identifying IoT devices 
even with new devices that the model was not trained before 
hence generalizing well. Hence, this research work with 
DeepNetPrint aids cyber investigators in their challenge with 
identifying rogue IoT with limited network activity traces.  
Future research work will focus on identifying qualifiers 
to infer good network behavioral fingerprint of IoT to improve 
identification accuracy performance. Also, to extend the 
application of DeepNetPrint’s model construct beyond 
network activity traces to other forms of time series behavioral 
fingerprint identification.  
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